fiction of four thousand years of a culture) as a religion that devalues the experience of vision of God (and vision in general) and relegates it to the realm of idolatry. It is an absolutely unexamined axiom that "Hebraic impulses" must be toward an invisible God, who does not show Himself to humankind and only speaks that they may hear. Jay's statement reveals one source of the confusion that has led to the consensus that in Judaism God cannot be seen: it casually equates a "taboo on graven images or seeing the face of God" with an assertion that God is invisible and speaks but does not show Himself to humans. In fact, a threefold distinction must be drawn among (1) a theosophical doctrine that God is a being who cannot be seen; (2) a normative stricture (absolute or contingent) on seeing a God who can be seen; and (3) a stricture on making images of a visible God. Jay elides all three of these. In this essay I will try to show that the first of these is false for Talmudic Judaism, and the second is relative and contingent. The third is, of course, an absolute stricture.
My construction of the position of the eye in Rabbinic Judaism2 (and Christianity) represents almost a reversal of the roles "Hebraic" and "Hellenic. The two moments, according to Rabbinic tradition, in which God was held to have shown Himself to Israel were the two high points of the Heilsgeschichte, namely the giving of the Torah and the crossing of the Red Sea. At least in theory, the most severely textual/aural of all experiences was the revelation of the Torah at Mount Sinai. If there is any experience that ought a priori to be describable as involving "a God who speaks to humans who only listen," it is certainly this one. The Torah itself already explicitly indicates that at the former event God made Himself visible to the people. In Exod. 24:7-11 we read, And [Moses] took the Book of the Covenant and read it in the ears of the People, and they said, All that we have heard we will do and we will hear .... And Moses and Aaron, Nadav, Avihu and the seventy elders went up. And they saw the God of Israel and under His legs it was like a paving of sapphire and bright like the sky. And unto the nobles of the Israelites He did no damage, but they saw God and they ate and drank. the most effective of tools: the Platonic conception of a purely immaterial being." My only dissent from Stroumsa would be from his implication that this constitutes a deficiency in Rabbinic Judaism. In a full-length study of the body in Talmudic culture, I hope to argue that the Rabbinic belief in the corporeality of God is part of an entire culturalsemiotic system with major consequences for representation and social practice vis-a-vis women, the body, and sex.
4. See W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago, 1986), p. 32. 5. In my forthcoming book I hope to be able to explore these historical changes within Judaism more fully. It is important to note that vital strains of the older tradition were maintained in the Kabbalah, which for all its Neoplatonism was often closer in spirit to the religion of the Rabbis of the Talmud than was the theology of the Jewish scholastics.
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It is actually quite astounding that Judaism could ever be described as having an invisible God, given the evidence of these verses and many others. In the Torah God can be seen, and indeed this conclusion is well accepted in biblical studies today.6 Normally one is not permitted to see God, and it is very dangerous to do so, which is why here the Torah makes explicit the fact that in this special moment the people were vouchsafed this vision without there being any danger.7
It will be more significant to establish, however, that in Rabbinic religion, even after the contact with Greek culture starting in the fourth century B.C., there was continued belief in and desire for the vision of God. We can find many texts that indicate such belief and desire. At the time of the giving of the Ten Commandments, the Torah tells us that "all of the People saw the voices" (Exod. 20:14). On this verse the midrash comments, "Rabbi Ishmael says, They saw what could be seen and heard what could be heard," but Rabbi Akiva, who, as we shall see, strongly privileges seeing, interprets, "They saw what can be heard."8 At the time of the giving of the Torah, even that which normally only could be heard could be seen! Thus it is not surprising that that which can be seen was seen at that time.
I find the most dramatic counterevidence to the claim of purely linguistic/aural revelation in that, for the midrash, sight of God inhabits the very heart of revelation as part of its essential structure, and even the very communication of the Law is at least partly visual. This shift from the aural to the visual in the revelation is signaled in midrash by a shift in understanding of the demonstrative pronoun.9 Demonstratives can mean in three ways: as anaphora and kataphora they refer to discourse, that is, to that which is heard about and not present to sight at the moment of speech. As deixis, however, they invoke an actual movement of pointing on the part of the speaker, necessarily, therefore, designating an object present in the field of sight. It is indeed 6. For a full collection of biblical passages that refer to people seeing God, see G. W. W. Baudissin, "'Gott schauen' in der alttestamentlichen Religion," Archiv fur Religionswissenschaft 18 (1915): 173-239. See also James Barr, "Theophany and Anthropomorphism in the Old Testament," Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 7 (1960): 31-38.
7. Barr makes the same point: "There is however, and I think from very early times, the tradition not so much that the deity is invisible as that it is deadly for man to see him" (Barr, "Theophany and Anthropomorphism," p. 34).
8. Owing to the midrashic conviction that a demonstrative always denotes deixis, at least two of the verses cited here undergo remarkable semantic transitions. The most obvious reading of the Exodus verse is that God is referring to the month as an abstract entity-a passing of a certain amount of time-and saying, this upcoming month, this month of Nissan, will be for you the most important of months. Such a rendering takes the demonstrative as kataphora, referring to that which is yet to be mentioned in the discourse. Yet because the Rabbis insist on the deictic reading of the demonstrative, they are forced to understand the verse as referring to a concrete and visible object, the moon. A similar thing happens in the case of the verse from Leviticus. Again it seems the demonstrative is referring to that which is heard in the language of the verse, that is, to the list of the unclean animals; however, as the midrash reads the text, as deixis, there is an actual pointing to the animals themselves. What is significant in the present context is not so much the shift in meaning the verses undergo, but the implication of this deixis, drawn so explicitly by Rabbi Akiva: namely, that God's finger-the instrument of pointing-was also visible to Moses at the time of this revelation and that this visual moment-this primacy of the eye with its capacity for immediately grasping that which is absent in purely linguistic expression-is that which made possible the very communication of these laws between God and Israel. Already we can see that we have powerful counterevidence to the commonplace description of an invisible God and purely aural revelation in Judaism.
The implication of this text for our concerns was finely and explicitly drawn in a somewhat later midrashic text, which can be taken as a commentary on the one just cited: Since the verse "This is My God, and I will beautify Him" is part of the Song at the Sea, the praise that the Jews rendered God immediately after the miracle of crossing the Red Sea, the Rabbis understood as well that at that moment in history God showed Himself clearly to all of the people present. Had He not done so, they could hardly have pointed at Him and said, "This is My God." Thus we find the deictic reading of the demonstrative pronoun once more giving rise to a theosophical understanding of the visibility of the Godhead. This point is "The Lord is a man of war" is the verse immediately following "This is My God." It describes, therefore, how God looked to the people when they pointed to Him above the Red Sea. In order to thicken that description, as it were, the midrashist collects all of the verses in the Bible in which God is described as having weapons and the form of a warrior. These are the guises in which He revealed Himself to the sea and to the people Israel at the time of the passage. In concluding this section, I would say that there can be very little doubt that in early Rabbinic Judaism God was understood as a being who could be seen. There was, of course, an absolute taboo on making images of God, but the taboo on seeing God was only relative. Similar to the taboo of approaching the Holy Ark for those who were not fit to do so, violation of the taboo could result in death or injury, but it was nevertheless, even then, possible to see God. Moreover, there were certain circumstances in which God also permitted special people (and even, occasion- It seems to me not too much to suggest, therefore, that Rabbi Akiva's midrashic transformation of "maidens" into "until death" alludes to this very verse, in which death is transformed into maidens by the later midrash.
Now it is very important to note that Ps. 48 is itself a meditation on history. The psalmist, speaking at some indefinite time, recalls the distant past of the splitting of the sea in a series of blatant allusions to Exod. 15, the same text Rabbi Akiva is interpreting.26 The psalmist declares, "as we have heard, so have we seen," citing the very transformation of history into present experience that Rabbi Akiva enacts by his transformation of anaphora into deixis. The transformation in both cases is enacted precisely via a hermeneutic act: in the case of the psalm by connecting present reality with memory and thus reliving the remembered experience, and in the case of the midrash by reading the Torah in such a way that the experience of presence related becomes available to the reader. Finally, the psalmist draws past and present together with the future with his words, "In order that you tell the last generation: this is God, our God, until eternity. He will lead us until death." "This is God," God who is present, God whom we will again be able to see and point to:
Said the Holy Blessed One, in this world they were perishing, because they saw My Glory, for it says, "No person may see Me and live" (Exod. 33:20), but in the next world, when I will return My Presence to Zion, I will be revealed in all My Glory to Israel and they will see Me and live forever, for it says "Eye to eye will they see" (Is. 52:8), and not only that but they will point out my Glory one to the other with the finger, and say, "this is God, our God," [our verse of psalms] and it says, "On that day, behold this is Our God Whom we have hoped for, this is the Lord for Whom we have waited" (Is. 25:10).27
The psalm replicates in its thematics the very interpretation of history that the midrash makes both in its thematics and in its hermeneutic method. For the psalmist, it seems, the promise of God's self-revelation, of seeing Him again, as He was seen at the crossing of the sea, redeems the vicissitudes of history. However, it seems to me that we must clearly distinguish the midrashic reading of the Song from that of allegorists such as Origen. Aphoristically, we might say that the direction of Origen's reading is from the concrete to the abstract, while the direction of midrash is from the abstract to the concrete. Or, using Jakobsonian terminology, at least heuristically, we could say that allegorical reading involves the projection of the syntagmatic plane (metonymy) of the text onto a paradigmatic plane of meaning while midrash projects paradigms (metaphor) into a syntagmatic plane of narrative history. Thus, while these are seemingly similar strategies of reading (and often genetically connected ones),30 Origen's allegoresis and midrash are really quite different from each other. I would like to add two clarifications at this point. The first is that the category of "allegory," both as a means of text production and as a reading practice, is a notoriously slippery one. Therefore, it should be clear that when I say allegoresis I mean allegorical reading of the Philonic-Origenal type, which has a fairly clear structure as well as explicit theoretical underpinnings. The other point that I wish to clarify here is that I am not contrasting Jewish with Christian modes of reading. The Gospels themselves, Paul, and even much later Christian literature contain much that is midrashic in hermeneutic structure (more, in my opinion, than is currently recognized, for example, Piers Plowman). Moreover, much authentic Jewish hermeneutic is allegorical or otherwise "logocentric" in structure. Nor am I trying to valorize midrash over Alexandrian allegoresis; I wish only to clarify the two modes of reading as different in order to understand midrash better.
Let us consider this difference by examining Origen's reflections on his method. In the third book of his great commentary on the Song of Songs, the Alexandrian father has discussed in detail the theory behind his allegoresis. It is explicitly founded on a Platonic-Pauline theory of correspondence between the visible things of this world and the invisible things of God.31 Origen goes on to say: So, as we said at the beginning, all the things in the visible category can be related to the invisible, the corporeal to the incorporeal, and the manifest to those that are hidden; so that the creation of the world itself, fashioned in this wise as it is, can be understood through the divine wisdom, which from actual things and copies teaches us things unseen by means of those that are seen, and carries us over from earthly things to heavenly.
But this relationship does not obtain only with creatures; the Divine Scripture itself is written with wisdom of a rather similar sort. Because of certain mystical and hidden things the people is visibly led forth from the terrestrial Egypt and journeys through the desert, where there was a biting serpent, and a scorpion, and thirst, and where all the other happenings took place that are recorded. All these events, as we have said, have the aspects and likenesses of certain hidden things. And you will find this correspondence not only in the Old Testament Scriptures, but also in the actions of Our Lord and Saviour that are related in the Gospels.
If, therefore, in accordance with the principles that we have now established all things that are in the open stand in some sort of relation to others that are hidden, it undoubtedly follows that the visible hart and roe mentioned in the Song of Songs are related to some patterns of incorporeal realities, in accordance with the character borne by their bodily nature. And this must be in such wise that we ought to be able to furnish a fitting interpretation of what is said about the Lord perfecting the harts, by reference to those harts that are unseen and hidden. [SS, p. 223] Origen's text describes a perfect correspondence between the ontology of the world and that of the text. In both there is an outer shell and an inner meaning. We see accordingly the metaphysical grounding of the allegorical method used by Origen, and indeed by Philo as well.32 In order for the Scripture to have an "inner meaning," there must be an ontological structure that allows for inner meaning. Allegoresis is thus explicitly founded in a Platonic universe. This Platonic universe is exactly the one in which God is incorporeal, cannot be seen with eyes of flesh, and can only be rendered in language by figures that make Him seem visible to the "eyes of the mind." In that ontotheology, in order for God to become visible to man He must be transformed, incarnated in flesh. The text, too, is an incarnation in visible language of the invisible things of the world. As R. P. Lawson has pointed out, "If the Logos 32. Whitman writes that it is "Origen who first conceives of the different kinds of interpretation as a simultaneous tripartite 'depth' within a given passage, rather than simply alternate strategies for various passages" (Whitman, Allegory, p. 63). It may be that Origen first articulated such a theory explicitly, but surely Philo denied the literal sense of neither the historical nor legal passages of the Pentateuch while at the same time giving them an allegorical reading.
